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Introduction
How does regional integration affect national social poli-
cies? Despite extensive literature on globalization’s effects 
on social spending, and despite dramatic growth in the 
number of regional organizations and the intra-regional 
movement of goods, capital, and labor, the literature inves-
tigating regional integration’s impact on social policies is 
comparatively underdeveloped. Furthermore, given that 
most international trade is regionalized, rather than glo-
balized, some scholars argue that regional integration’s 
effect on national policies may be stronger than the effect 
of globalization (Beckfield, 2006).1
This article presents an empirical analysis indicating 
that increasing regional integration is associated with 
increased levels of social spending. Its findings show that 
as states integrate into regional political and economic 
institutions, they do not necessarily face a “race to the bot-
tom” in social spending in which governments compete to 
cut spending—and the tax burden on domestic firms—in 
order to attract foreign firms and prevent domestic firms 
from relocating to neighboring states where it is cheaper to 
do business. Instead, I find that in most states, regional 
integration is associated with higher levels of social spend-
ing. The research makes several contributions. First, it 
contributes to the nascent literature on social policies in 
the developing world.2 Second, it applies well-developed 
and oft-tested theories about the domestic effects of inter-
national economic pressures to cases outside of the OECD 
context. Scholars writing in the “race to the bottom”/ 
“climb to the top” school either have assumed these theo-
ries would not hold or have neglected to test these theories 
beyond OECD states. Finally, I employ an innovative 
measure of regional integration developed at the regional 
level of analysis by other researchers (Efird and Genna, 
2002), applying it to individual countries from 1980–2000, 
a period of time that captures important changes in levels 
of regional integration all over the globe.
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Regionalization, globalization, and 
social spending
Regional integration refers to the process of increasing 
political and economic cooperation among states in close 
geographic proximity to each other.3 Scholars often concep-
tualize regional integration as two broadly conceived pro-
cesses: economic integration and political integration. 
Economic integration, they argue, is a more informal, soci-
etally-driven process that removes trade and investment bar-
riers (Haggard, 1993; Katzenstein, 2005). This type of 
integration has been occurring at significant levels around 
the world. Political integration is a more top-down, state-
driven process of institutional creation at the regional level 
(Fawcett, 2004; Katzenstein, 2005). Marchand et al. (1999) 
conceive of political integration as a policy project moti-
vated by interests, but also by identity and ideological fac-
tors. Political integration, including the creation of regional 
political institutions, is a process that has developed much 
more slowly outside of Europe, although recent develop-
ments in Southeast Asia and South America suggest renewed 
efforts on this score (Börzel and Risse, 2009; Jetschke, 
2010). Over the last few decades, the degree of integration 
that regional trading organizations have actually imple-
mented has increased substantially (Efird and Genna, 2002; 
Haftel 2007). Figure 1 demonstrates these trends.
Regional integration is contested because, like globaliza-
tion, it creates national policy externalities as labor and capi-
tal mobility increase. Certainly, regional integration is related 
to the larger process of globalization. It is, however, a distinct 
form of international embeddedness that differs from glo-
balization in several important ways. Regional integration 
can place different demands on governments than globaliza-
tion processes more generally because it can be more strongly 
institutionalized, can generate higher cross-border flows, and 
can take on elements of political integration or supranation-
alism that are absent from the anarchic global level.
Economically, states may pursue regional integration 
in order to achieve fuller liberalization than they would 
be able to achieve under multilateral trading agreements 
(Lawrence, 1996). With greater capital mobility within 
the region, states may have an incentive to cut social 
programs and corporate tax rates in order to make their 
economies more attractive to businesses. Social dumping 
and migration to member states with more generous social 
policies can also put strain on those welfare states. Beyond 
economic pressures, regional integration includes a politi-
cal dimension that exists to a much lesser degree at the 
global level. Regionalization is more highly institutional-
ized than globalization and it can lead member states to 
pursue certain policies in a way that most global organiza-
tions, including the World Trade Organization, are unable 
to do (Beckfield, 2006). For example, Pierson (1996) 
argues that, in the EU member states, national political 
actors can pursue welfare state retrenchment more suc-
cessfully than they could prior to EU membership because 
they can blame their cuts on the EU and suffer less politi-
cal backlash from voters.
On the other hand, regional integration could have posi-
tive social outcomes if states compensate society for eco-
nomic insecurity with increased social spending, or if social 
policies are created or protected at the supranational level. 
Caporaso and Tarrow (2009) argue that this is exactly what 
has happened in the EU. Examining the implications of the 
free movement of labor in the EU on national social policy 
frameworks, they contend that the European Court of 
Justice has actively promoted the protection of social rights 
at the regional level (though they did not look at spending). 
Finally, regional integration may have no effect on social 
policies, allowing for continued divergence in these poli-
cies cross-nationally.
How has social spending changed over the past few 
decades, and how can we link these changes to globaliza-
tion or regionalization processes? Missing data is a sig-
nificant problem for assessing spending trends in 
non-OECD countries. The data on spending across the 
developing world is extremely sparse, so we should be 
very cautious when drawing conclusions from the data 
that is available. The graph in Figure 2 presents spending 
averages in OECD and non-OECD countries over the last 
few decades; the trend for non-OECD countries especially 
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Figure 2. Social spending as a percentage of total government 
expenditures.
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Theoretical perspectives
Existing theories of both globalization and regionalization 
can shed light on the ways regional integration may affect 
national social policy spending. “Race to the bottom” or 
convergence approaches would expect regionalization to 
exacerbate the economic pressures placed on states by 
greater economic interdependence and globalization. 
Scholars argue that the pressures to be competitive in global 
markets reduce national policy autonomy in areas ranging 
from social policy to fiscal policy to monetary policy 
(Cerny, 1995; Rodrik, 1998). Some analysts argue that the 
“race to the bottom” effect is most likely to operate on 
developing countries (Rudra, 2002). If increasing market 
integration pressures governments to adopt similar policies, 
we should expect the integration of regional markets, which 
is often deeper than integration achieved by global institu-
tions like the WTO, to heighten these pressures. Regional 
integration could lead to cuts in social spending as coun-
tries within regional organizations compete to attract (or 
keep) capital. By reducing expenditures, governments may 
be able to lower corporate tax rates, making their country a 
more attractive place to do business. The “race to the bot-
tom” hypothesis suggests that as regional integration 
increases, especially in terms of trade and capital openness, 
social spending is likely to decrease.
Other scholars argue that the insecurities imposed on social 
groups by global competition fuel demands for states to 
increase social spending. These demands produced the post-
WWII expansion of the welfare state in most of the advanced 
capitalist democracies (Cameron, 1978; Katzenstein, 1985). 
Under conditions of regionalization, this welfare state expan-
sion can be viewed as a way for governments to compensate 
workers for the stronger wage competition of the regional 
market’s larger labor pool. The compensation hypothesis sug-
gests that as regional integration increases, social spending is 
also likely to increase.
Finally, the null hypothesis is that regional integration is 
not related to changes in national social spending. If we do 
observe cuts or growth in social policy among members of 
regional trading agreements, these changes will be the result 
of other processes, such as globalization or domestic changes. 
Many argue that changes in welfare state spending are pri-
marily the result of domestic processes such as deindustriali-
zation or demographic changes rather than international-level 
processes such as globalization or regionalization (Huber 
and Stevens, 2001; Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Mosley 2003). 
I test some of these domestic-level variables in this study.
Variables, data, and methodology
In this study, I use time-series cross-sectional panel data for 
all possible countries, from 1980–2000, the years for which 
the most data is available. Despite the significant problems 
with missing data for non-OECD countries on several 
variables, including my dependent variable, a major purpose 
of this study is to understand the effects of regionalization in 
a wider comparative context that goes beyond the EU and 
other OECD countries. Because of sparse data from the 
developing world, however, results should be interpreted 
cautiously.
The unit of analysis in this study is the country-year. The 
dependent variable is social welfare spending. I measure 
this as the ratio of social welfare spending to total govern-
ment expenditures.5 This measure may better capture gov-
ernment spending priorities than does a measure of social 
spending as a percentage of GDP (Wibbels and Ahlquist, 
2011a: 138). Social welfare expenditures, as defined by the 
IMF measure, include government spending for welfare 
purposes, including pension and retirement benefits, unem-
ployment benefits, sickness and old age benefits, and fam-
ily allowances. I draw data for this variable from Wibbels 
and Ahlquist (2011b), whose data is sourced from IMF 
Government Finance Statistics, the Economic Commission 
of Latin America (CEPAL), and from their own primary 
data collection efforts.
The key independent variable is level of regional inte-
gration. To measure the extent to which a country has inte-
grated into a regional body, I use Efird and Genna’s (2002) 
Integration Achievement Score (IAS). Efird and Genna 
developed this multi-dimensional measure from original 
data on the levels of regional integration actually achieved 
in all cases of regional integration reported to the WTO, up 
until 2004. They assign each organization an IAS score for 
each year that the organization has been in existence. Their 
coding system looks at six categories of regional economic 
and political integration—trade, capital mobility, labor 
mobility, supranational institutionalization, monetary pol-
icy coordination, and fiscal policy coordination—and gives 
each regional organization a score between zero and five 
for each category. Each organization’s IAS score is the 
average of the levels of integration achieved in each cate-
gory. The coding system is described in full detail in the 
appendices at the end of this article. The IAS measure is 
one of only a small handful of attempts to code regions 
according to the level of integration that is actually imple-
mented.6 In this way, this measure should allow us to 
advance studies of regionalization and empirically test the-
ories of regionalization’s causes and effects.
In this study I have applied this measure of regional inte-
gration to the country level of analysis, although Efird and 
Genna devised the measure with the region as the unit of 
analysis. For example, they measured the level of regionali-
zation achieved by Mercosur for each year of Mercosur’s 
existence. Because I am interested in the domestic effects of 
individual countries’ levels of integration into regional 
frameworks, my unit of analysis is the country-year. I have 
thus coded each member state of a regional organization with 
the IAS score that the organization achieved in that year. A 
potential problem with this application of the IAS score is 
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that there may be significant variation in the degree to which 
member states of the same organization implement agreed-
upon integration measures. There may also be significant 
cases of noncompliance. To address this, I have adjusted 
each country’s IAS score in a given year to take into account 
any formal ways it opted out of deeper integration that other 
member states of the organization pursued. For example, the 
EU countries that have opted out of the single currency 
receive a lower score than those that have adopted the euro. 
While this partially addresses the issue of variation in region-
alization among members of the same organization, this 
measure cannot account for informal ways that individual 
member states may obstruct regional integration.
Finally, I limited the cases of regional integration in this 
study to multilateral organizations that have achieved at 
least a free trade area: the EU, Mercosur, the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the North American 
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the European Free Trade 
Area (EFTA), the Central American Common Market 
(CACM), the Andean Common Market (ANCOM), and the 
Caribbean Community (CARICOM). I did not include 
members of regional organizations in Africa or the Middle 
East in this analysis because of severe missing data prob-
lems for my dependent variable. I assigned countries a 
score of zero in all years prior to joining a regional organi-
zation. When a country was a member of more than one 
regional body, I assigned it the higher of the two scores.
I have included several variables in my model to control 
for other commonly theorized determinants of social welfare 
spending. First, it is important to attempt to distinguish 
between regionalization and globalization effects, though 
these certainly overlap. To control for the influence of glo-
balization, I control for trade openness, measured as the 
total number of imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP 
(“World Development Indicators,” World Bank), and for 
FDI (foreign direct investment) openness, measured as the 
total stocks of inward plus outward FDI as a percentage of 
GDP (“UNCTADStat,” United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development). Second, I control for several 
domestic-level variables that have been theorized to affect 
social spending levels. I control for GDP per capita, the per-
centage of the population that is over 65 years old, the per-
centage of the population working in the service sector (all 
drawn from the World Development Indicators), and the 
strength of democracy (from the Polity IV score, Marshall 
et al., 2004). These domestic variables test arguments that 
higher levels of development, democracy, deindustrializa-
tion, and population ageing should put upward pressure on 
governments’ levels of social spending.7 Finally, I control 
for EU membership in order to ensure that the “European 
model” of generous national welfare states under high levels 
of regional integration does not bias the results of my 
broader cross-national model.
I estimate the effects of regional integration on social 
spending for the time period of 1980–2000. With cross-
national data that spans such a broad swath of countries, 
there are many country-specific factors that could influ-
ence social spending levels. In order to account for these 
Table 1. Social spending as a percentage of total government expenditures.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 (All countries) (Non-EU countries) (EU countries only)
 Time-series Time-series Time-series
 fixed-effects fixed-effects fixed-effects









































EU dummy −10.243***  
(1.413)
 






Number of observations 528 346 182
*p < 0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.
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country-specific factors, and for omitted variable bias, I 
estimate the model as a time-series with country fixed-
effects. While my baseline model includes all countries, I 
run an additional model that excludes EU countries, as well 
as a third model consisting of only EU countries. Given the 
emphasis in the literature on the “uniqueness” of the EU 
model of high social spending combined with high region-
alization, it is important to ensure these countries do not 
bias the results of the broader cross-national models.
Results
In Table 1, for the full sample of countries (Model 1), regional 
integration has a significant and positive effect on social spend-
ing, suggesting that in a given country, as integration increases 
over time, social spending as a percentage of total government 
expenditures increases as well. Substantively, a one-point 
increase in a country’s IAS score is associated with a 1.9% 
increase in social spending as a percentage of total government 
expenditures. The only other independent variables that reach 
statistical significance in this model are GDP per capita and the 
dummy variable controlling for EU membership. Higher levels 
of economic development are likely associated with higher 
social spending because as economies develop, domestic social 
groups become better mobilized and acquire more resources to 
lobby governments successfully for welfare benefits.
The results of the full model suggest that, as countries 
become more integrated into regional economic and politi-
cal structures, they will not necessarily face economic pres-
sures that force cuts in social welfare spending. In fact, 
countries that are more economically open and politically 
integrated within their region tend to spend more on social 
welfare. But considering that that level of development and 
EU membership are the only other two independent varia-
bles that predict social spending at a statistically significant 
level, we might reasonably wonder if the highly integrated 
EU states are driving these results.
To address this concern, Model 2 (Table 1) employs a 
time-series fixed-effects analysis on a sample that excludes 
EU countries. In case the effects of EU candidacy may also 
bias the results, I also excluded states that would become EU 
members in the future. The results of Model 2 again indicate 
that as a country becomes more regionally integrated over 
time, its social welfare expenditures are likely to increase as 
well, even after controlling for the effects of increased global 
integration (captured by the trade and FDI openness varia-
bles) and for domestic demographic and structural factors. 
The exclusion of the EU countries increases confidence in 
the general applicability of this relationship.
Two other variables are statistically significant in this 
model: FDI openness and size of the elderly population. FDI 
openness has a negative effect on social spending, though its 
effects are substantively very small. Countries with substan-
tial levels of foreign investment may be pressured to keep 
corporate taxes low, and this may constrain government social 
expenditures. Not surprisingly, having a large population that 
is over 65 years old is positively and significantly associated 
with social spending. The relatively large size of this coeffi-
cient gives some support to arguments that domestic demo-
graphic have a greater influence on social spending levels 
than international factors (Iversen and Cusack, 2000; Pierson, 
2001).
Finally, I estimated the effects of increased regional inte-
gration on the EU member states only. Again using time-
series fixed-effects, the results were surprising. I found that 
increasing levels of integration over time are associated with 
lower welfare spending as a percentage of total expenditures 
in these states. This finding is the opposite of what I found in 
the full sample as well as in the sample consisting of only 
non-EU countries. This finding suggests that in EU countries 
where social expenditures already make up a significant per-
centage of government expenditures, openness to the well-
developed and highly competitive European markets does 
constrain social spending. The fact that neither openness to 
trade nor FDI are significant suggests that there is something 
specific about integrating into EU structures, rather than 
global structures, that constrains social spending. This could 
be related to monetary integration in the EU, to the constraints 
on national fiscal policy imposed by the Maastricht criteria, 
and to the limits on member states’ public debts and deficits. 
The democracy variable is excluded from this model, as slow-
moving institutional variables tend to be highly collinear with 
country fixed-effects, and there is extremely little variation on 
the Polity score for the EU sample in this time period. There 
is also little variation in the percentage of the population over 
age 65 in this model, so the large, negative, and significant 
coefficient on that variable may not be reliable.
Interestingly, trade openness is not significantly related 
to social spending in any of the models, nor does its coef-
ficient have a substantial size. Social expenditures are bet-
ter predicted by the degree to which countries are more 
broadly integrated into economic and political institutions 
in their region. Trade is certainly a component of this 
regional integration, but other dimensions of regionaliza-
tion, such as greater labor mobility, may counterbalance 
potential “race to the bottom” competitive pressures.
As a robustness check, I estimated the three above mod-
els using an alternative indicator of regional integration 
developed by Haftel (2007) that combines measures of the 
scope of institutionalization and implementation of regional 
integration agreements. This measure was coded at five-
year intervals, so there are considerably fewer data points. 
With the exception of the final EU-only model (Model 3, 
Table 1), for which there are too few observations for a 
meaningful analysis (n=24), the other two models (Models 
1 and 2) generate similar results to those reported above. 
Level of regional integration is positive and significantly 
associated with social spending, even when controlling for 
other leading explanations in the international political 
economy literature.
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Discussion and conclusions
This study uses one of a very few existing datasets on the 
implementation of regional integration to probe an understud-
ied question, and it yields some interesting and unexpected 
results that provoke further analysis. Overall, the results of this 
study are consistent with theories of globalization or regional 
integration that predict continued divergence of national social 
spending levels. The results of my country fixed-effects mod-
els show that greater regionalization is associated with higher 
levels of social spending in the broad cross-national sample. 
However, a surprising finding was that this is not the case in 
the EU countries. Here, social spending decreased as regional 
integration increased, suggesting that regionalization does 
constrain social spending either when levels of integration are 
very high, or when social spending commitments are very 
high. The potential interaction between level of development 
and regionalization should be further explored.
Despite limitations introduced by missing data, espe-
cially for developing countries, this study is a first step in 
assessing how regionalization affects national social policy 
commitments outside of the EU. It is important to empha-
size that the central finding that regionalization is associated 
with higher social policy spending in the broader compara-
tive context, even when controlling for other international 
and domestic-level factors, should be carefully interpreted. 
The results here are supportive of the divergence hypothe-
sis, rather than the convergence or “race to the bottom” 
hypotheses. I do not argue that regional integration causes 
governments to increase social spending. Yet, it is clear 
from this study that most countries that integrate into 
regional economic and political organizations will not be 
forced to reduce social spending as a percentage of govern-
ment expenditures. Indeed, greater national commitments to 
social welfare often occur alongside regional integration.
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Notes
1. Lawrence (1996) demonstrated that the growth of trade 
within regional trading blocs is far greater than the growth 
of trade between different trading blocs or between blocs and 
the rest of the world.
2. See Avelino et al., 2005; Rudra, 2002; Wibbels, 2006; and 
Wibbels and Ahlquist, 2011a as other notable examples.
3. Space constraints prevent a thorough discussion of the 
causes and dimensions of regional integration. For a more 
in-depth overview of regional integration from a compara-
tive perspective, see Madeira and Caporaso (2011).
4. To calculate spending averages across the developing world I 
did not impute missing data as others have done (see Rudra, 
2002) because there are serious methodological concerns with 
this procedure. The trends above are based on 1,492 observa-
tions between 1972 and 1999 for all non-OECD countries.
5. This is the measurement employed by Rudra (2002) and 
Wibbels and Ahlquist (2011a).
6. Haftel (2007) provides an alternative measure.
7. See Adserà and Boix, 2002; Brown and Hunter, 1999; Iversen 
and Cusack, 2000.
References
Adserà A and Boix C (2002) Trade, democracy, and the size of 
the public sector: The political underpinnings of openness. 
International Organization 56(2): 229–262.
Avelino G, Brown DS and Hunter W (2005) The effects of capital 
mobility, trade openness, and democracy in Latin America. 
American Journal of Political Science 49(3): 625–641.
Beckfield J (2006) European integration and income inequality. 
American Sociological Review 71(4): 964–985.
Börzel TA and Risse T (2009) Diffusing (inter-) regionalism: The 
EU as a model of regional integration. KFG Working Paper 
7. Berlin: Freie Universität.
Brown DS and Hunter W (1999) Democracy and social spend-
ing in Latin America, 1980–1992. The American Political 
Science Review 93(4): 779–790.
Cameron D (1978) The expansion of the public economy: A com-
parative analysis. American Political Science Review 72(4): 
1243–1261.
Caporaso JA and Tarrow S (2009) Polanyi in Brussels: 
Supranational institutions and the transnational embedding 
of markets. International Organization 63(4): 593–620.
Cerny PG (1995) Globalization and the changing logic of collec-
tive action. International Organization 49(4): 595–625.
Efird B and Genna GM (2002) Structural conditions and the pro-
pensity for regional integration. European Union Politics 3 
(3): 267–295.
Fawcett L (2004) Exploring regional domains: A comparative his-
tory of regionalism. International Affairs 80(3): 429–446.
Haftel YZ (2007) Designing for peace: Regional integration 
arrangements institutional variation, and militarized inter-
state disputes. International Organization 61(1): 217–237.
Haggard S (1993) Comment. In: Frankel JA and Kahler M (eds) 
Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in 
Pacific Asia. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Huber E and Stevens JD (2001) Development and Crisis of the 
Welfare State. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
International Monetary Fund (2011) Government Finance 
Statistics. Available at: www.imf.org/external/data.htm.
Iversen T and Cusack TR (2000) The causes of welfare state 
expansion: Deindustrialization or globalization?. World 
Politics 52(3): 313–349.
Jetschke A (2010) Do regional organizations travel? KFG 
Working Paper 17. Berlin: Freie Universität.
Katzenstein P (1985) Small States in World Markets. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.
 by guest on November 7, 2014rap.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Madeira 7
Katzenstein P (2005) A World of Regions. Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press.
Lawrence RZ (1996) Regionalism, Multilateralism, and 
Deeper Integration. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution.
Madeira MA and Caporaso JA (2011) Regional integration. 
International Encyclopedia of Political Science. London: 
SAGE.
Marchand M, Morten B and Shaw TM (1999) The political econ-
omy of new regionalisms. Third World Quarterly 20 (5): 
897–910.
Marshall MG, Jaggers K and Gurr T (2004) Polity IV. College 
Park, MD: University of Maryland.
Mosley L (2003) Global Capital and National Governments. New 
York: Cambridge University Press.
Pierson P (1996) The new politics of the welfare state. World 
Politics 48(2): 143–179.
Pierson P (ed.) (2001) The New Politics of the Welfare State. New 
York: Oxford University Press.
Rodrik D (1998) Why do more open economies have bigger gov-
ernments? Journal of Political Economy 106(5): 997–1032.
Rudra N (2002) Globalization and the decline of the welfare state 
in less-developed countries. International Organization 
56(2): 411–445.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (2014) 
UNCTADStat. Available at: http://unctadstat.unctad.org.
Wibbels E (2006) Dependency revisited: International markets, 
business cycles, and social spending in the developing world. 
International Organization 60(2):433–468.
Wibbels E and Ahlquist JS (2011a) Development, Trade, and Social 
Insurance. International Studies Quarterly 55 (1):125–149.
Wibbels E and Ahlquist JS (2011b) Replication data for: “Trade, 
Development, and Social Insurance.” International Studies 
Quarterly 2011”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15466 V3 
[Version].
World Bank (2014) World Development Indicators. The World 
Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/
world-development-indicators.
Appendix A:
Integration achievement score (Efird and Genna, 2002)
Variable Value range Description
G&S 0 to 5 Free movement of goods and services
Cap 0 to 5 Free movement of capital
Lab 0 to 5 Free movement of labor
SI 0 to 5 Supranational institutions
MC 0 to 5 Monetary coordination
FC 0 to 5 Fiscal coordination
EIAS 0 to 5 Economic integration achievement score
 Average of G&S, Cap, and Lab
PIAS 0 to 5 Political integration achievement score
 Average of SI, MC, and FC
IAS 0 to 5 Integration achievement score
 Average of G&S, Cap, Lab, SI, MC, and FC
Each abbreviation is defined in the description column.
Appendix B:
IAS coding system (Efird and Genna, 2002)
1. Trade in goods and services
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers
1 = Preferential tariff agreement
2 = Partial free trade area
3 = Full free trade area
4 = Customs union (common external tariffs)
5 = No barriers among member countries
2. Degree of capital mobility
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility
1 = Foreign direct investment allowed in limited form
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government procurement
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large-scale mergers and acquisitions
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Appendix C:
Detailed source information on variables in dataset
1) DV: Social expenditures as a percentage of government expenditures
From Wibbels E and Ahlquist JS, “Replication data for: ‘Trade, Development, and Social Insurance’ International Studies 
Quarterly 2011”, http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/15466 V3 [Version].
2) Regional integration (primary measure)
From the Integration Achievement Scores Dataset, Version 4.0 (5/2010). Described in Efird B and Genna GM (2002) 
Structural Conditions and the Propensity for Regional Integration. European Union Politics 3(3): 267–295.
In this dataset, regional organizations are the unit of analysis. As described in the main article, I applied this measure 
at the country level and recoded where necessary to reflect country-level variation in integration, among members of the 
same organization. I used information available on the websites of the regional organizations about opt-outs and special 
exemptions for various members to identify these country-level differences in integration among members of the same 
organization.
3) Regional integration (secondary measure used as robustness check)
From Haftel dataset described in Haftel YZ (2007) Designing for peace: Regional integration arrangements institutional 
variation, and militarized interstate disputes. International Organization 61(1): 217–237.
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction
3. Degree of labor mobility
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions
2 = Full right of movement
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices
5 = Full freedom of movement
4. Level of supranational institution importance
0 = No supranational institutions
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions
2 = Information gathering and advisory role
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node
5. Degree of monetary policy coordination
0 = No monetary policy coordination
1 = Consultation regarding policy
2 = Commitment to maintain parity
3 = Coordinated interventions
4 = Regional central bank establishment
5 = Single currency
6. Degree of fiscal policy coordination
0 = No fiscal policy coordination
1 = Consultation regarding policy
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments
4 = Uniform tax code
5 = Single budget
Appendix B. (Continued)
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4) Trade openness
Measured as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP, constructed from import and export flow data from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database, various years.
5) FDI openness
Measured as the total stocks of inward plus outward FDI as a percentage of GDP, constructed using FDI data from 
UNCTADStat, various years.
6) GDP per capita, current US dollars
World Development Indicators, various years.
7) GDP, current US dollars
World Development Indicators, various years.
8) Percentage of population over 65 years old
World Development Indicators, various years.
9) Democracy measure
Measured using the Polity IV indicator from Marshall MG, Jaggers K, Gurr T (2004) Polity IV. College Park, MD: 
University of Maryland. Dataset available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproject.html
10) Percentage of population employed in service sector
World Development Indicators, various years.
11) Membership in EU or candidate for EU membership
Author’s own coding using information about membership on the EU’s website http://europa.eu/index_en.htm
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